Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences, Allameh Tabatabai University

2 Department of Sociology, Shahid Beheshti University

3 Department of Sociology, Mohaghegh Ardabili University

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to test Slanner's model of the relationship between inequality and corruption, called the "inequality trap."The inequality trap starts with high levels of inequality and leads to rising levels of corruption by lowering generalized trust and then deepening inequality. we examine the inequality trap hypothesis with the institutionalist approach using Bertelsmann project transition indicators.For this purpose, from 136 countries studied in Bertelsmann study, 19 countries in Mena region were selected as the target sample. Then, by comparative-fuzzy method, four effective conditions at the institutional level including governance capacity, rule of law, free media and social capital on the outcome variable, ie inequality-corruption trap and exit from it were analyzed individually and in combination.
The results of single causal analysis showed that the absence of any of the four conditions in the event of corruption is a necessary condition and causal paths to inequality-corruption also reveal two separate paths in the study countries revealing one path, lack of governance capacity and another.It was not a combination of three conditions or a weakness in the rule of law, free media and social capital.In addition, causal analyzes aimed at overcoming the trap of inequality-corruption in successful countries also showed that in these countries, the existence of a capable government in combination with social capital or free media is sufficient to achieve the result.

Keywords

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