Document Type : Research Paper

Author

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10.22054/qjsd.2022.69300.2385

Abstract

A prelude to the critical reconstruction of theories related to oil exporting countries
Mahdi Omidi
The present article, while giving a general overview of the theories that have been developed in recent decenniums about the oil exporting countries in the world, seeks to highlight the role of concepts that have been given less attention or at least accentuation in these theories.
On this substratum, relying on the opinions of several cogitators in the fields of History, Sociology, Economics, and International Relations, we will point out the importance of the role of security in shaping different social orders in the oil regimes of different regions, and by criticizing the standard-oriented and negative narratives of these countries, we will accentuate the issue of the formation process of the field of the state in relation to other fields to provide a positive interpretation of these systems. This article only seeks to highlight categorical concepts and analyses and does not claim to theorize in the realm of political and economic systems of oil exporting countries. However, perpetuating to highlight the role of other concepts that have not been fixated on in the related works can avail to reconstruct the theories related to these countries.
However, perpetuating to highlight the role of other concepts that have not been fixated on in the related works can avail to.

Keywords

Main Subjects

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