Document Type : Research Paper
Authors
1 Ph.D student in the Faculty of Law and Political Science, Allameh Tabatabai University
2 Associate Professor of Faculty of Law and Political Sciences of Allameh Tabatabai University
Abstract
Knowing dimensions of the government's capacity in Iran is very important because after Islamic Revolution, economic activity of the government has expanded for many reasons and this problem has caused inefficiency in political and economic sectors of the country. The purpose of this research is to investigate causes of Iran's government inefficiency in formation and support of a powerful and independent private sector in the period from 1358 to 1384. In this research, the documentary method was used to collect data and the causal analysis method (process tracing technique) was used to determine effects of research variables. The results of research show that the political structure that emerged after victory of the 1957 revolution, with unequal distribution of wealth and creation of rent among groups close to their own intellectual space, removed other social and political groups from the competition. Ended the result of such a process will be the government's tools in hands of certain social groups in order to maintain and expand their interests. The political blockage created in the economic arena through tools such as creating ambiguity in laws and regulations and distorting transparency in competitive mechanisms followed and led to formation of government monopoly and inefficiency; continuation of such a process has made the formation of the independent private sector in the country face serious problems.
Keywords
- The government of the I.R.I
- private sector
- Article 44 of the Constitution
- legal capacity of the government
Main Subjects
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